About three weeks ago, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced that
physical barriers would be placed at key spots along the “Green Line” -
separating pre-1967 Israel from Judea and Samaria. The implementation of the
‘separation’ plan began last month, with Israel Defense Forces engineering corps
setting obstacles in place and digging trenches between PA-controlled Tul Karem
and the heavily populated, and often targeted, Netanya region. The second stage
of construction includes the erection of an electric fence on the borders of
population centers in Israel. More ambitiously, on April 29, 2002, Israeli
Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer said that within two years a fence will be
erected along the entire length of the country. Often referred to as the “wall”
and supported by much of the Israeli Left and some of the Right, along with some
prominent members of the defense establishment, the fences and barriers between
Israel and Judea, Samaria and Gaza are meant to provide (some) Israelis with a
greater measure of security from terrorist infiltrators. The “wall”, however, is
a false panacea, much like the Oslo Accords were before it, for both tactical
and strategic reasons.
“There is nothing more foolish than to build walls of this
nature, as history has shown us time and again,” according to Dr. Aryeh Stav,
Director of the Ariel Center for Policy Research, “The Maginot Line, the Great
Wall of China, and others were truly impenetrable by the standards of the times
in which they were built - yet collapsed totally at the moment that they were
really needed.” He called the idea that a fence will stop terrorism, “total
self-delusion.” Stav, and others, have pointed out the painfully obvious fact
that the fences along Israel’s border with Egypt have been notoriously porous
when it comes to preventing the smuggling of weapons and ammunition to the
Palestinian Authority. Similarly, the fence along Israel’s northern border
failed to prevent the kidnapping of three soldiers patrolling the perimeter, nor
did it prevent the fatal March 12th terrorist attack that took place
near Kibbutz Metzubah in the Galilee, carried out by Lebanese infiltrators. It
also failed to shield Israel from more than 1,000 rockets fired by the Hizbullah
in the month of April.
Arab thinkers themselves have made it clear that the wall is
merely another challenge to be overcome in their struggle against the Jewish
State. The Egyptian Al-Wafd newspaper proclaimed, “Here is another Berlin
Wall being established, not in Germany but in Palestine.” Calling the wall a
“public inauguration of the apartheid regime that is to be established in
Palestine…”, Knesset member Azmi Bishara, writing in the Lebanese
as-Safir, openly advocated the adoption of a strategy by the PLO that
“makes the occupation costly for the occupier, while allowing the population
under occupation to sustain that resistance in the long term.” In other words,
if the Arab world adopts Bishara’s line of thinking, the Israeli implementation
of passive defense against terrorist attacks will only precipitate redoubled
efforts to perpetrate such attacks. The Hizbullah may well serve as the model in
such a scenario, as occurred after Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon.
The comments of MK Bishara and al-Wafd actually point to
another, deeper problem with the planned Israeli defenses. Both the Berlin Wall
and apartheid created artificial separation where there was no natural one and
both ultimately crumbled. Similarly, the 1967 “Green Line” is not a natural
boundary, it merely delineates the armistice lines of the 1948 War of
Independence. A fence along an almost arbitrary line down the middle of one
natural geographic unit will not hold up over time, as the two sides of the line
are naturally interdependent. This can be seen most acutely in the organic
unification of the Arab municipalities of Baka al-Gharabiya in pre-’67 Israel
and Baka al-Sharakiya in the administered territories. Many Arab villages along
the “Green Line” are dependent on Jewish communities on the other side of the
line for much of their income and many Arabs throughout Palestinian Authority
areas work in pre-’67 Israel.
In implementing the “wall” Israel is also backpedaling away from
its own policy in facing and defeating Arab aggression. It has returned to the
age of the “Wall and Tower” settlements (“homa umigdal”), established to
defend Jews from the violence of the 1936-39 nationwide Arab riots. The founders
of Kibbutz Hanita in the western Galilee, one of 57 such Jewish settlements,
“proposed they defend themselves by setting up a protective wall all around the
settlement, by digging trenches and erecting towers for look-out posts.” While
that may have been appropriate when the Jews were not in a position to exercise
authority as a sovereign state, that period was to have ended a long time ago.
Indeed, the Israeli military doctrine, until the implementation of the Oslo
Accords, was quite different from the “Wall and Tower” mentality. Not dependent
on passive defensive measures, the IDF took the battle to the enemy’s territory
as quickly as possible, exacting a heavy price on the aggressor’s home turf.
David Raziel, Commander in Chief of the Irgun from 1937-1941, said
it best 60 years ago, “If the objective of the war is to break the will of the
enemy… we clearly cannot be content with defensive action… Such a method of
defense, which enables the enemy to attack as he sees fit and to retreat at
will, to reorganize and to attack again - such defense is known as ‘passive
defense’ and ends in defeat and ruin… he who does not wish to be defeated must
attack.” The lack of a decisive, swift and overwhelming military response to
PLO-backed terrorist attacks, from the very beginning of the ‘Oslo process’,
along with the current construction of a ‘Great Wall of Israel’ indicate to the
Arabs that the Jews are in retreat, locking the gates of the ghetto at night for
fear of marauding pogromchiks. Unless that impression is quickly
reversed, renewed and novel Arab attacks may turn the latest Israeli defensive
measure into another ‘Wailing Wall.’